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Abstract
The paper proposes a new knowledge representation language, calledDLP<, which extends disjunc-
tive logic programming (with strong negation) by inheritance. The addition of inheritance enhances
the knowledge modeling features of the language providing a natural representation of default rea-
soning with exceptions.
A declarative model-theoretic semantics of DLP< is provided, which is shown to generalize the An-
swer Set Semantics of disjunctive logic programs.
The knowledge modeling features of the language are illustrated by encoding classical nonmono-
tonic problems in DLP<.
The complexity of DLP< is analyzed, proving that inheritance does not cause any computational
overhead, as reasoning in DLP< has exactly the same complexity as reasoning in disjunctive logic
programming. This is confirmed by the existence of an efficient translation from DLP< to plain dis-
junctive logic programming. Using this translation, an advanced KR system supporting the DLP<
language has been implemented on top of the DLV system and has subsequently been integrated into
DLV.
1 Introduction
Disjunctive logic programs are logic programs where disjunction is allowed in the heads of
the rules and negation as failure (NAF) may occur in the bodies of the rules. Such programs
are now widely recognized as a valuable tool for knowledge representation and common-
sense reasoning (Baral and Gelfond 1994, Lobo, Minker and Rajasekar 1992, Gelfond and
Lifschitz 1991). One of the attractions of disjunctive logic programming is its ability to nat-
urally model incomplete knowledge (Baral and Gelfond 1994, Lobo et al. 1992). The need
to differentiate between atoms which are false because of the failure to prove them true
(NAF, or CWA negation) and atoms the falsity of which is explicitly provable led to extend
disjunctive logic programs by strong negation (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991). Strong nega-
tion, permitted also in the heads of rules, further enhances the knowledge modeling fea-
tures of the language, and its usefulness is widely acknowledged in the literature (Alferes
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and Pereira 1992, Baral and Gelfond 1994, Kowalski and Sadri 1990, Alferes, Pereira and
Przymusinski 1996, Sakama and Inoue 1996, Alferes, Pereira and Przymusinski 1998b).
However, it does not allow to represent default reasoning with exceptions in a direct and
natural way. Indeed, to render a default rule r defeasible, r must at least be equipped with
an extra negative literal, which “blocks” inferences from r for abnormal instances (Gel-
fond and Son 1997). For instance, to encode the famous nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR)
example stating that birds normally fly while penguins do not fly, one should write1 the
rule
fly(X)← bird(X), not ¬fly(X).
along with the fact
¬fly(penguin).
This paper proposes an extension of disjunctive logic programming by inheritance,
called DLP<. The addition of inheritance enhances the knowledge modeling features of
the language. Possible conflicts are solved in favor of the rules which are “more specific”
according to the inheritance hierarchy. This way, a direct and natural representation of
default reasoning with exceptions is achieved (e.g., defeasible rules do not need to be
equipped with extra literals as above – see section 4).
The main contributions of the paper are the following:
• We formally define the DLP< language, providing a declarative model theoretic
semantics of DLP<, which is shown to generalize the Answer Set Semantics of
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991).
• We illustrate the knowledge modeling features of the language by encoding classical
nonmonotonic problems in DLP<. Interestingly, DLP< also supplies a very natural
representation of frame axioms.
• We analyze the computational complexity of reasoning over DLP< programs. Im-
portantly, while inheritance enhances the knowledge modeling ability of disjunctive
logic programming, it does not cause any computational overhead, as reasoning in
DLP< has exactly the same complexity as reasoning in disjunctive logic program-
ming.
• We compareDLP< to related work proposed in the literature. In particular, we stress
the differences between DLP< and Disjunctive Ordered Logic (DOL) (Buccafurri,
Leone and Rullo 1998, Buccafurri, Leone and Rullo 1999); we point out the re-
lation to the Answer Set Semantics of (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991); we compare
DLP< with prioritized disjunctive logic programs (Sakama and Inoue 1996); we
analyze its relationships to inheritance networks (Touretzky 1986) and we discuss
the possible application of DLP< to give a formal semantics to updates of logic pro-
grams. (Alferes, Leite, Pereira, Przymusinska and Przymusinski 1998a, Marek and
Truszczyn´ski 1994, Leone, Palopoli and Romeo 1995).
• We implement a DLP< system. To this end, we first design an efficient translation
from DLP< to plain disjunctive logic programming. Then, using this translation,
we implement a DLP< evaluator on top of the DLV system (Eiter, Leone, Mateis,
1 not and ¬ denote the weak negation symbol and the strong negation symbol, respectively.
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Pfeifer and Scarcello 1998). It is part of DLV and can be freely retrieved from (Faber
1999).
The sequel of the paper is organized as follows. The next two sections provide a for-
mal definition of DLP<; in particular, its syntax is given in Section 2 and its semantics
is defined in Section 3. Section 4 shows the use of DLP< for knowledge representation
and reasoning, providing a number of sample DLP< encodings. Section 5 analyzes the
computational complexity of the main reasoning tasks arising in the framework of DLP<.
Section 6 discusses related work. The main issues underlying the implementation of our
DLP< system are tackled in Section 7, and our conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
2 Syntax of DLP<
This section provides a formal description of syntactic constructs of the language.
Let the following disjoint sets be given: a set V of variables, a set Π of predicates, a set
Λ of constants, and a finite partially ordered set of symbols (O, <), where O is a set of
strings, called object identifiers, and < is a strict partial order (i.e., the relation < is: (1)
irreflexive – c 6< c ∀c ∈ O, and (2) transitive – a < b ∧ b < c⇒ a < c ∀a, b, c ∈ O).
A term is either a constant in Λ or a variable in V .2
An atom is a construct of the form a(t1, ..., tn), where a is a predicate of arity n in Π
and t1, ..., tn are terms.
A literal is either a positive literal p or a negative literal ¬ p, where p is an atom (¬
is the strong negation symbol). Two literals are complementary if they are of the form
p and ¬p, for some atom p.
Given a literal L, ¬.L denotes its complementary literal. Accordingly, given a set A of
literals, ¬.A denotes the set {¬.L | L ∈ A}.
A rule r is an expression of the form
a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an ← b1, · · · , bk, not bk+1, · · · , not bm
⊗
n ≥ 1, m ≥ 0
where a1, · · · , an, b1, · · · , bm are literals, not is the negation as failure symbol and
⊗
is
either (1) the symbol ’.’ or (2) the symbol ’!’. In case (1) r is a defeasible rule, in case (2)
it is a strict rule.
The disjunction a1∨· · ·∨an is the head of r, while the conjunction b1, . . . , bk, not bk+1,
. . . , not bm is the body of r. b1, ..., bk is called the positive part of the body of r and
not bk+1, ..., not bm is called the NAF (negation as failure) part of the body of r. We
often denote the sets of literals appearing in the head, in the positive, and in the NAF part
of the body of a rule r by Head(r), Body+(r), and Body−(r), respectively.
If the body of a rule r is empty, then r is called fact. The symbol ’←’ is usually omitted
from facts.
An object o is a pair 〈oid(o),Σ(o)〉, where oid(o) is an object identifier in O and Σ(o)
is a (possibly empty) set of rules.
A knowledge base on O is a set of objects, one for each element of O.
Given a knowledge base K and an object identifier o ∈ O, the DLP< program for o (on
K) is the set of objects P = {(o′,Σ(o′)) ∈ K | o = o′ or o < o′}.
2 Note that function symbols are not considered in this paper.
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The relation < induces a partial order on P in the obvious way, that is, given oi =
(oid(oi),Σ(oi)) and oj = (oid(oj),Σ(oj)), oi < oj iff oid(oi) < oid(oj) (read ”oi is
more specific than oj”).
A term, an atom, a literal, a rule, or program is ground if no variable appears in it.
Informally, a knowledge base can be viewed as a set of objects embedding the definition
of their properties specified through disjunctive logic rules, organized in an IS-A (inheri-
tance) hierarchy (induced by the relation <). A program P for an object o on a knowledge
baseK consists of the portion ofK ”seen” from o looking up in the IS-A hierarchy. Thanks
to the inheritance mechanism, P incorporates the knowledge explicitly defined for o plus
the knowledge inherited from the higher objects.
If a knowledge base admits a bottom element (i.e., an object less than all the other
objects, by the relation <), we usually refer to the knowledge base as “program”, since
it is equal to the program for the bottom element.
Moreover, we represent the transitive reduction of the relation < on the objects.3 An
object o is denoted as oid(o) : o1, . . . , on Σ(o)4 , where (oid(o), o1), . . ., (oid(o), on) are
exactly those pairs of the transitive reduction of <, in which the first object identifier is
oid(o). o is referred to as sub-object of o1, . . . , on.
Example 1
Consider the following program P :
o1 { a ∨ ¬b← c, not d. e← b! }
o2 : o1 { b. ¬a ∨ c. c← b. }
P consists of two objects o1 and o2. o2 is a sub-object of o1. According to the convention
illustrated above, the knowledge base on which P is defined coincides with P , and the
object for which P is defined is o2 (the bottom object).
3 Semantics of DLP<
In this section we assume that a knowledge base K is given and an object o has been
fixed. Let P be the DLP< program for o on K. The Universe UP of P is the set of all
constants appearing in the rules. The Base BP of P is the set of all possible ground literals
constructible from the predicates appearing in the rules of P and the constants occurring
in UP . Note that, unlike in traditional logic programming the Base of a DLP< program
contains both positive and negative literals. Given a rule r occurring inP , a ground instance
of r is a rule obtained from r by replacing every variable X in r by σ(r), where σ is a
mapping from the variables occurring in r to the constants inUP . We denote by ground(P)
the (finite) multiset of all instances of the rules occurring in P . The reason why ground(P)
is a multiset is that a rule may appear in several different objects of P , and we require
the respective ground instances be distinct. Hence, we can define a function obj of from
ground instances of rules in ground(P) onto the set O of the object identifiers, associating
with a ground instance r of r the (unique) object of r.
3 (a, b) is in the transitive reduction of < iff a < b and there is no c such that a < c and c < b.
4 The set Σ(o) is denoted without commas as separators.
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A subset of ground literals in BP is said to be consistent if it does not contain a pair of
complementary literals. An interpretation I is a consistent subset of BP . Given an inter-
pretation I ⊆ BP , a ground literal (either positive or negative) L is true w.r.t. I if L ∈ I
holds. L is false w.r.t. I otherwise.
Given a rule r ∈ ground(P), the head of r is true in I if at least one literal of the head
is true w.r.t I . The body of r is true in I if: (1) every literal in Body+(r) is true w.r.t. I ,
and (2) every literal in Body−(r) is false w.r.t. I . A rule r is satisfied in I if either the head
of r is true in I or the body of r is not true in I .
Next we introduce the concept of a model for a DLP<-program. Different from tradi-
tional logic programming, the notion of satisfiability of rules is not sufficient for this goal,
as it does not take into account the presence of explicit contradictions. Hence, we first
present some preliminary definitions.
Given two ground rules r1 and r2 we say that r1 threatens r2 on a literal L if (1) ¬.L ∈
Head(r1) and L ∈ Head(r2), (2) obj of(r1) < obj of(r2) and (3) r2 is defeasible,
Definition 1
Given an interpretation I and two ground rules r1 and r2 such that r1 threatens r2 on L
we say that r1 overrides r2 on L in I if: (1) ¬.L ∈ I , and (2) the body of r2 is true in I .
A (defeasible) rule r ∈ ground(P) is overridden in I if for each L ∈ Head(r) there
exists r1 ∈ ground(P) such that r1 overrides r on L in I .
Intuitively, the notion of overriding allows us to solve conflicts arising between rules
with complementary heads. For instance, suppose that both a and ¬a are derivable in I
from rules r and r′, respectively. If r is more specific than r′ in the inheritance hierarchy
and r′ is not strict, then r′ is overridden, meaning that a should be preferred to ¬a because
it is derivable from a more trustable rule.
Observe that, by definition of overriding, strict rules cannot be overridden, since they
are never threatened.
Example 2
Consider the program P of Example 1. Let I = {¬a, b, c, e} be an interpretation. Rule
¬a ∨ c← . in the object o2 overrides rule a ∨ ¬b← c, not d. in o1 on the literal a in I.
Moreover, rule b← . in o2 overrides rule a ∨ ¬b← c, not d. in o1 on the literal ¬b in I.
Thus, the rule a ∨ ¬b← c, not d. in o1 is overridden in I.
Example 3
Consider the following program P :
o1 { ¬a! ¬b. }
o2 : o1 { a← not b. b← not a. }
Consider now the interpretations M1 = {a,¬b} and M2 = {b,¬a}. While the rule ¬b. is
overridden in M2, the rule ¬a! cannot be overridden since it is a strict rule. Due to over-
riding, strict rules and defeasible rules are quite different from the semantic point of view.
In our example, the overriding mechanism allows us to invalidate the defeasible rule ¬b.
in favor of the more trustable one b← not a. (w.r.t. the interpretation M2). In words, the
defeasible rule is invalidated in M2 because of a more specific contradictory rule and no in-
consistency is generated. In other words, it is possible to find an interpretation containing
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the literal b (i.e., stating an exception for the rule ¬b.) such that all the rules of P are either
satisfied or overridden (i.e., invalidated) in it. Such an interpretation is just M2. This cannot
happen for the strict rule ¬a!. Indeed, no interpretation containing the literal a (i.e., stating
an exception for the strict rule) can be found which satisfies all non-overridden rules of P .
In the example above we have implicitly used the notion of model for a program P that
we next formally provide. A model for a program is an interpretation satisfying all its non
overridden rules.
Definition 2
Let I be an interpretation for P . I is a model for P if every rule in ground(P) is satisfied
or overridden in I . I is a minimal model for P if no (proper) subset of I is a model for P .
Note that strict rules must be satisfied in every model, since they cannot be overridden.
Example 4
It is easy to see that M1 = {a,¬b} is not a model for the programP of Example 3 since the
rule ¬a! is neither overridden nor satisfied. On the contrary, M2 = {b,¬a} is a model for
P , since ¬b. is overridden by the rule b← not a. The latter rule is satisfied since b ∈ M2.
The rule ¬a! is satisfied as ¬a ∈ M2 and the rule a← not b. is satisfied since both body
and head are false w.r.t. M2.
Next we define the transformation GI based on which our semantics is defined. This
transformation applied to a programP w.r.t. an interpretation I output a set of rules GI(P)
with no negation by failure in the body. Intuitively, such rules are those remaining from
ground(P) by (1) eliminating the rules overridden in the interpretation I , (2) deleting rules
whose NAF part is not ”true” in I (i.e., some literal negated by negation as failure occurs
in I) and (3) deleting the NAF part of all the remainder rules. Since the transformation
encodes the overriding mechanism, the distinction between strict rules and defeasible rules
in GI(P) is meaningless (indeed, there is no difference between strict and defeasible rules
except for the overriding mechanism where the upper rule is required to be defeasible). For
this reason the syntax of rules in GI(P) can be simplified by dropping the symbol . from
defeasible rules and the symbol ! from strict rules.
Definition 3
Given an interpretation I for P , the reduction of P w.r.t. I , denoted by GI(P), is the set of
rules obtained from ground(P) by (1) removing every rule overridden in I , (2) removing
every rule r such that Body−(r) ∩ I 6= ∅, (3) removing the NAF part from the bodies of
the remaining rules.
Example 5
Consider the program P of Example 1. Let I be the interpretation {¬a, b, c, e}. As shown
in Example 2, rule a ∨ ¬b← c, not d. is overridden in I. Thus, GI(P) is the set of rules
{¬a ∨ c. e← b. b. c← b. }. Consider now the interpretation M = {a, b, c, e}. It
is easy to see that GM (P) = {a ∨ ¬b← c. ¬a ∨ c. e← b. b. c← b.}.
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We observe that the reduction of a program is simply a set of ground rules. Given a set S
of ground rules, we denote by pos(S) the positive disjunctive program (called the positive
version of S), obtained from S by considering each negative literal ¬p(X¯) as a positive
one with predicate symbol ¬p.
Definition 4
Let M be a model for P . We say that M is a (DLP<-)answer set for P if M is a minimal
model of the positive version pos(GM (P)) of GM (P).
Note that interpretations must be consistent by definition, so considering pos(GM (P))
instead of GM (P) does not lose information in this respect.
Note that the notion of minimal model of Definition 2 cannot be used in Definition 4, as
GM is a set of rules and not a DLP< program.
Example 6
Consider the program P of Example 1:
It is easy to see that the interpretation I of Example 5 is not an answer set for P . Indeed,
although I is a model for pos(GI(P)) it is not minimal, since the interpretation {b, c, e} is
a model for pos(GI(P)), too. Note that the interpretation I′ = {b, c, e} is not an answer
set for P . Indeed, GI′(P) = { a ∨ ¬b← c. ¬a ∨ c. e← b. b. c← b. } and I′
is not a model for pos(GI′(P)), since the rule a ∨ ¬b← c. is not satisfied in I′.
On the other hand, the interpretation M of Example 5 is an answer set for P , since M is
a minimal model for pos(GM (P)). Moreover, it can be easily realized that M is the only
answer set for P .
Finally, the program P of Example 3 admits one consistent answer set M2 = {b,¬a}.
Note that if we replace the strict rule ¬a! by a defeasible rule ¬a., P admits two answer
sets, namely M1 = {a,¬b} and M2 = {b,¬a}. Asserting ¬a by a strict rule, prunes the
answer set M1 stating the exception (truth of the literal a) to this rule.
It is worthwhile noting that if a rule r is not satisfied in a model M, then all literals in the
head of r must be overridden in M.
Let P1 be the program
o3 { a ∨ b. ← b. }
o2 : o3 { ¬a. }
and P2
o1 { a. ← b. }
o2 : o1 { ¬a. }
Then, {¬a} is not a model for program P1, because the head literal b in the head of
a ∨ b. is not overridden in M. If we drop b from rule a ∨ b., then {¬a} is a model of the
resulting program P2.
Observe also that two programs having the same answer sets, as o1 and o3 (both have
the single answer set {¬a}), may get different answer sets even if we add the same object
to both of them. Indeed, program P1 has no answer set, while program P2 has the answer
set {¬a}.
This is not surprising, as a similar phenomenon also arises in normal logic programming
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where P1 = {a.} and P2 = {a← notb.} have the same answer set {a}, while P1 ∪ {b.}
and P2 ∪ {b.} have different answer sets ({a, b} and {b}, respectively).
Finally we show that each answer set of a program P is also a minimal model of P :
Proposition 1
If M is an answer set for P , then M is a minimal model of P .
Proof
By contradiction suppose M ′ is a model for P such that M ′ ⊂M .
First we show that M ′ is a model for pos(GM (P)) too, i.e., every rule in pos(GM (P))
is satisfied in M ′. Recall that pos(GM (P)) is the positive version of the program obtained
by applying the transformation GM to the program ground(P). Consider a generic rule r
of ground(P). Since M ′ is a model for P either (i) r is overridden in M ′ or (ii) is satisfied
in M ′.
In case (i), since M ′ ⊂ M , from Definition 1 immediately follows that r is overridden
in M too. Thus, r does not occur in GM (P) since the transformationGM removes all rules
overridden in M .
In case (ii) (i.e., r is satisfied in M ′), if r is such that B(r) ∩M 6= ∅, then the rule is
removed by GM . Otherwise, r is transformed by GM into a rule r′ obtained from r by
dropping the NAF part from the body. Since r is satisfied in M ′, also r′ is satisfied in M ′.
As a consequence, all the rules of pos(GM (P)) are satisfied in M ′, that is M ′ ⊂ M is a
model for pos(GM (P)). Thus, by Definition 4, M is not an answer set for P since it is not
a minimal model of pos(GM (P)). The proof is hence concluded.
4 Knowledge Representation with DLP<
In this section, we present a number of examples which illustrate how knowledge can be
represented using DLP<. To start, we show the DLP< encoding of a classical example of
nonmonotonic reasoning.
Example 7
Consider the following program P with O(P) consisting of three objects bird, penguin
and tweety, such that penguin is a sub-object of bird and tweety is a sub-object of
penguin:
bird { flies. }
penguin : bird { ¬flies! }
tweety : penguin { }
Unlike in traditional logic programming, our language supports two types of negation, that
is strong negation and negation as failure. Strong negation is useful to express negative
pieces of information under the complete information assumption. Hence, a negative fact
(by strong negation) is true only if it is explicitly derived from the rules of the program.
As a consequence, the head of rules may contain also such negative literals and rules can
be conflicting on some literals. According to the inheritance principles, the ordering rela-
tionship between objects can help us to assign different levels of reliability to the rules,
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allowing us to solve possible conflicts. For instance, in our example, the contradicting con-
clusion tweety both flies and does not fly seems to be entailed from the program (as tweety
is a penguin and penguins are birds, both flies and ¬flies can be derived from the
rules of the program). However, this is not the case. Indeed, the ”lower” rule ¬flies.
specified in the object penguin is considered as a sort of refinement to the first general
rule, and thus the meaning of the program is rather clear: tweety does not fly, as tweety is a
penguin. That is, ¬flies. is preferred to the default rule flies. as the hierarchy explicitly
states the specificity of the former. Intuitively, there is no doubt that M = {¬flies} is the
only reasonable conclusion.
The next example, from the field of database authorizations, combines the use of both weak
and strong negation.
Example 8
Consider the following knowledge base representing a set of security specification about a
simple part-of hierarchy of objects.
o1
{
authorize(bob)← not authorize(ann). (1)
authorize(ann)∨ authorize(tom)← not ¬authorize(alice). (2)
authorize(amy)! (3)
}
o2 : o1
{
¬authorize(alice)! (4)
}
o3 : o1
{
¬authorize(bob)! (5)
}
Object o2 is part-of the object o1 as well as o3 is part-of o1. Access authorizations to
objects are specified by rules with head predicate authorize and subjects to which autho-
rizations are granted appear as arguments. Strong negation is utilized to encode negative
authorizations that represent explicit denials. Negation as failure is used to specify the ab-
sence of authorization (either positive or negative). Inheritance implements the automatic
propagation of authorizations from an object to all its sub-objects. The overriding mech-
anism allows us to represent exceptions: for instance, if an object o inherits a positive
authorization but a denial for the same subject is specified in o, then the negative autho-
rization prevails on the positive one. Possible loss of control due to overriding mechanism
can be avoided by using strict rules: strict authorizations cannot be overridden.
Consider the program Po2 = {(o1, {(1), (2), (3)}), (o2, {(4)})} for the object o2 on the
above knowledge base. This program defines the access control for the object o2. Thanks
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to the inheritance mechanism, authorizations specified for the object o1, to which o2 be-
longs, are propagated also to o2. It consists of rules (1), (2) and (3) (inherited from o1)
and (4). Rule (1) states that bob is authorized to access object o2 provided that no autho-
rization for ann to access o2 exists. Rule (2) authorizes either ann or tom to access o2
provided that no denial for alice to access o2 is derived. The strict rule (3) grants to amy
the authorization to access object o1. Such authorization can be considered ”strong”, since
no exceptions can be stated to it without producing inconsistency. As a consequence, all
the answer sets of the program contain the authorization for amy. Finally, rule (4) defines
a denial for alice to access object o2. Due to the absence of the authorization for ann,
the authorization to bob of accessing the object o2 is derived (by rule (1)). Further, the
explicit denial to access the object o2 for alice (rule (4)) allows to derive neither autho-
rization for ann nor for tom (by rule (2)). Hence, the only answer set of this program is
{authorize(bob),¬authorize(alice), authorize(amy)}.
Consider now the program Po3 = {(o1, {(1), (2)}), (o3, {(5)})} for the object o3.
Rule (5) defines a denial for bob to access object o3. The authorization for bob (de-
fined by rule (1)) is no longer derived. Indeed, even if rule (1) allows to derive such an
authorization due to the absence of authorizations for ann, it is overridden by the ex-
plicit denial (rule (5)) defined in the object o3 (i.e., at a more specific level). The body
of rule (2) inherited from o1 is true for this program since no denial for alice can be de-
rived, and it entails a mutual exclusive access to object o3 for ann and tom (note that
no other head contains authorize(ann) or authorize(bob)). The program Po3 admits
two answer sets, namely {authorize(ann), ¬authorize(bob), authorize(amy)} and
{authorize(tom), ¬authorize(bob), authorize(amy)} representing two alternative
authorization sets to grant the access to the object o3.
Solving the Frame Problem
The frame problem has first been addressed by McCarthy and Hayes (McCarthy and Hayes
1969), and in the meantime a lot of research has been conducted to overcome it (see e.g.
(Shanahan 1997) for a survey).
In short, the frame problem arises in planning, when actions and fluents are specified:
An action affects some of the fluents, but all unrelated fluents should remain as they are.
In most formulations using classical logic, one must specify for every pair of actions and
unrelated fluents that the fluent remains unchanged. Clearly this is an undesirable overhead,
since with n actions and m fluents, n×m clauses would be needed.
Instead, it would be nice to be able to specify for each fluent that it “normally remains
valid” and that only actions which explicitly entail the contrary can change them.
Indeed, this goal can be achieved in a very elegant way usingDLP<: One object contains
the rules which specify inertia (the fact that fluents normally do not change). Another
object inherits from it and specifies the actions and the effects of actions — in this way
a very natural, straightforward and effective representation is achieved, which avoids the
frame problem.
Example 9
As an example we show how the famous Yale Shooting Problem, which is due to Hanks
and McDermott (Hanks and McDermott 1987), can be represented and solved with DLP<:
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The scenario involves an individual (or in a less violent version a turkey), who can be
shot with a gun. There are two fluents, alive and loaded, which intuitively mean that the
individual is alive and that the gun is loaded, respectively. There are three actions, load,
wait and shoot. Loading has the effect that the gun is loaded afterwards, shooting with
the loaded gun has the effect that the individual is no longer alive afterwards (and also that
the gun is unloaded, but this not really important), and waiting has no effects.
The problem involves temporal projection: It is known that initially the individual is
alive, and that first the gun is loaded, and after waiting, the gun is shot with. The question
is: Which fluents hold after these actions and between them?
In our encoding, the inertia object contains the defaults for the fluents, the domain ob-
ject additionally specifies the effects of actions, while the yale object encodes the problem
instance.
For the time framework we use the DLV bounded integer built-ins: The upper bound n
of positive integers is specified by either adding the fact #maxint = n. to the program
or by passing the option −N = n on the commandline (this overrides any #maxint = n.
statement). It is then possible to use the built-in constant #maxint, which evaluates to the
specified upper bound, and several built-in predicates, of which in this paper we just use
#succ(N, N1) , which holds if N1 is the successor of N and N1 ≤ #maxint. For additional
DLV built-in predicates, consult the DLV homepage (Faber and Pfeifer since 1996).
inertia
{
alive(T1)← alive(T),#succ(T, T1). (6)
¬alive(T1)← ¬alive(T),#succ(T, T1). (7)
loaded(T1)← loaded(T),#succ(T, T1). (8)
¬loaded(T1)← ¬loaded(T),#succ(T, T1). (9)
}
domain : inertia
{ (10)
loaded(T1)← load(T),#succ(T, T1)! (11)
¬loaded(T1)← shoot(T), loaded(T),#succ(T, T1)! (12)
¬alive(T1)← shoot(T), loaded(T),#succ(T, T1)! (13)
}
yale : domain
{ (14)
load(0)! wait(1)! shoot(2)! alive(0)! (15)
}
The only answer set for this program (and #maxint = 3) contains, besides the facts of
the yale object, loaded(1), loaded(2), alive(0), alive(1), alive(2) and¬loaded(3),
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¬alive(3). That is, the individual is alive until the shoot action is taken, and no longer
alive afterwards, and the gun is loaded between loading and shooting.
We want to point out that this formalism is equally suited for solving problems which
involve finding a plan (i.e. a sequence of actions) rather than doing temporal projection
(determining the effects of a given plan) as in the Yale Shooting Problem: You have to add
a rule action(T)∨ ¬action(T)← #succ(T, T1). for every action, and you have to spec-
ify the goal state by a query, e.g.¬alive(3),¬loaded(3)?A query is a DLV language fea-
ture which (for this example) is equivalent to the rules h← ¬alive(3),¬loaded(3). and
i← not h, not i., meaning that only answer sets containing¬alive(3) and¬loaded(3)
should be considered.
Below you find a classical plan-finding example: The blocksworld domain and the Suss-
man anomaly as a concrete problem.
Example 10
In (Erdem 1999), several planning problems, including the blocksworld problems, are en-
coded using disjunctive datalog.
In general, planning problems can be effectively specified using action languages (e.g.
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1993, Dung 1993, Giunchiglia and Lifschitz 1998, Lifschitz 1999)).
Then, a translation from these languages to another language (in our case DLP<) is ap-
plied.
We omit the step of describing an action language and the associated translation, and
directly show the encoding of an example planning domain in disjunctive datalog. This
encoding is rather different from the one presented in (Erdem 1999).
The objects in the blocksworld are one table and an arbitrary number of labeled cubic
blocks. Together, they are referred to as locations.
The state of the blocksworld at a particular time can be fully specified by the fluent
on(B, L, T), which specifies that block B resides on location L at time T.
So, first we state in the object bw inertia that the fluent on is inertial.
bw inertia
{
on(B, L, T1)← on(B, L, T),#succ(T, T1). (16)
}
We continue to define the blocksworld domain in the object bw domain, which inherits
from the inertia object:
bw domain : bw inertia
{
move(B, L, T)∨ ¬move(B, L, T)← block(B), loc(L),#succ(T, T1)! (17)
on(B, L, T1)← move(B, L, T),#succ(T, T1)! (18)
¬on(B, L, T1)← move(B, L1, T), on(B, L, T),#succ(T, T1)! (19)
← move(B, L, T), on(B1, B, T). (20)
← move(B, B1, T), on(B2, B1, T), block(B1). (21)
Disjunctive Logic Programs with Inheritance 13
initial:
b
c
a
c
b
a
goal:
Figure 1. The Sussman Anomaly
← move(B, B, T). (22)
← move(B, L, T), move(B1, L1, T), B<> B1. (23)
← move(B, L, T), move(B1, L1, T), L<> L1. (24)
loc(table)! (25)
loc(B)← block(B)! (26)
}
There is one action, which is moving a block from one location to another location. A
move is started at one point in time, and it is completed before the next time. Rule (17)
expresses that at any time T, the action of moving a block B to location L may be initiated
(move(B, L, T)) or not (¬move(B, L, T)).
Rules (18) and (19) specify the effects of the move action: The moved block is at the
target location at the next time, and no longer on the source location.
(20) – (24) are constraints, and their semantics is that in any answer set the conjunction
of their literals must not be true.5 Their respective meanings are: (20): A moved block must
be clear. (21): The target of a move must be clear if it is a block (the table may hold an
arbitrary number of blocks). (22) A block may not be on itself. (23) and (24): No two move
actions may be performed at the same time.
The timesteps are again represented by DLV’s integer built-in predicates and constants.
What is left is the concrete problem instance, in our case the so-called Sussman Anomaly
(see Figure 1):
sussman : bw domain
{
block(a)! block(b)! block(c)! (27)
on(b, table, 0)! on(c, a, 0)! on(a, table, 0)! (28)
}
on(c, b,#maxint), on(b, a,#maxint), on(a, table,#maxint)? (29)
Since different problem instances may involve different numbers of blocks, the blocks
are defined as facts (27) together with the problem instance.6
We give the initial situation by facts (28), while the goal situation is specified by query
5 We use constraints for clarity, but they can be eliminated by rewriting ← B. to p← B, not p., where p is a
new symbol which does not appear anywhere else in the program.
6 Note that usually the instance will be separated from the domain definition.
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(29). This query enforces that only those answer sets are computed, in which the conjunc-
tion of the query literals is true.
5 Computational Complexity
As for the classical nonmonotonic formalisms (Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1991, Marek and
Truszczyn´ski 1990, Reiter 1980), two important decision problems, corresponding to two
different reasoning tasks, arise in DLP<:
(Brave Reasoning) Given a DLP< programP and a ground literal L, decide whether there
exists an answer set M for P such that L is true w.r.t. M .
(Cautious Reasoning) Given a DLP< programP and a ground literal L, decide whether L
is true in all answer sets for P .
We next prove that the complexity of reasoning in DLP< is exactly the same as in tra-
ditional disjunctive logic programming. That is, inheritance comes for free, as the addition
of inheritance does not cause any computational overhead. We consider the propositional
case, i.e., we consider ground DLP< programs.
Lemma 1
Given a ground DLP< program P and an interpretation M for P , deciding whether M is
an answer set for P is in coNP.
Proof
We check in NP that M is not an answer set of P as follows. Guess a subset I of M , and
verify that: (1) M is not a model for pos(GM (P)), or (2) I is a model for pos(GM (P))
and I ⊂M . The construction of pos(GM (P)) (see Definition 3) is feasible in polynomial
time, and the tasks (1) and (2) are clearly tractable. Thus, deciding whether M is not an
answer set for P is in NP, and, consequently, deciding whether M is an answer set for P
is in coNP.
Theorem 1
Brave Reasoning on DLP< programs is ΣP2 -complete.
Proof
Given a ground DLP< program P and a ground literal L, we verify that L is a brave
consequence of P as follows. Guess a set M ⊆ BP of ground literals, check that (1) M is
an answer set for P , and (2) L is true w.r.t. M . Task (2) is clearly polynomial; while (1) is
in coNP, by virtue of Lemma 1. The problem therefore lies in ΣP2 .
ΣP2 -hardness follows from Theorem 3 and the results in (Eiter and Gottlob 1995, Eiter,
Gottlob and Mannila 1997b).
Theorem 2
Cautious Reasoning on DLP< programs is ΠP2 -complete.
Proof
Given a groundDLP< programP and a ground literal L, we verify that L is not a cautious
consequence of P as follows. Guess a set M ⊆ BP of ground literals, check that (1) M is
an answer set for P , and (2) L is not true w.r.t. M . Task (2) is clearly polynomial; while
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(1) is in coNP, by virtue of Lemma 1. Therefore, the complement of cautious reasoning is
in ΣP2 , and cautious reasoning is in ΠP2 .
ΠP2 -hardness follows from Theorem 3 and the results in (Eiter and Gottlob 1995, Eiter
et al. 1997b).
6 Related Work
6.1 Answer Set Semantics
Answer Set Semantics, proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991),
is the most widely acknowledged semantics for disjunctive logic programs with strong
negation. For this reason, while defining the semantics of our language, we took care of
ensuring full agreement with Answer Set Semantics (on inheritance-free programs).
Theorem 3
Let P be a DLP< program consisting of a single object o = 〈oid(o),Σ(o)〉.7 Then, M is
an answer set ofP if and only if it is a consistent answer set ofΣ(o) (as defined in (Gelfond
and Lifschitz 1991)).
Proof
First we show that GM (P) is equal to Σ(o)M (as defined in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991)):
Deletion rule (1) of Definition 3 never applies, since for every literal L and any two
rules r1, r2 ∈ ground(P), obj of(r1) 6< obj of(r2) holds, thus violating condition (1) in
Definition 1 and therefore no rule can be overridden. It is evident that the deletion rules (2)
and (3) of Definition 3 are equal to deletion rules (i) and (ii) of the definition of ΠS in §7
in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991), respectively. The first ones delete rules, where some NAF
literal is contained in M , while the second ones delete all NAF literals of the remaining
rules.
Next, we show that the criteria for a consistent set M of literals being an answer set of a
positive (i.e. NAF free) program (as in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991)) is equal to the notion
of satisfaction:
Since the set is consistent, condition (ii) in §7 of (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) does not
apply. Condition (i) says: Lk+1, . . . , Lm ∈ M (the body is true) implies that the head is
true. This is logically equivalent to “The body is not true or the head is true”, which is the
definition of rule satisfaction.
In total we have that the minimal models of pos(GM (P)) are equal to the consistent
answer sets of Σ(o)M , since answer sets are minimal by definition.
Additionally, we require in Definition 4 that M is also a model of P , while in (Gel-
fond and Lifschitz 1991) there is no such requirement. However, all minimal models of
pos(GM (P)) are also models of P : All rules in GM (P) are satisfied, and only the dele-
tion rules (2) and (3) of Definition 3 have been applied (as shown above). So, for any rule
r, which has been deleted by (2), some literal in Body−(r) is in M , so r’s body is not
true, and thus r is satisfied in M . If a rule r, which has been transformed by (3), is satisfied
7 On inheritance-free programs, there is no difference between strict and defeasible rules. Therefore, without
loss of generality we assume that rules are of only one type here. This allows us to drop the symbol (’.’ or ’!’)
at the end of the rules of single object programs.
16 F. Buccafurri, W. Faber and N. Leone
without Body−(r), then either Head(r) is true or Body+(r) is not true, so adding any
NAF part to it does not change its satisfaction status.
Theorem 3 shows that the set of rules contained in a single object of a DLP< program
has precisely the same answer sets (according to the definition in (Gelfond and Lifschitz
1991)) as the single object program (according to Definition 4).
For a DLP< program P consisting of more than one object, the answer sets (as de-
fined in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991)) of the collection of all rules in P in general do not
coincide with the answer sets of P .
For instance the program
o { p. }
o1 : o { ¬p. }
has the answer set {¬p}, while the disjunctive logic program {p. ¬p.} does not have a
consistent answer set.
Nevertheless, in Section 7.1 we will show that each DLP< program P can be translated
into a disjunctive logic program P ′, the semantics of which is equivalent to the semantics
of P . However, this translation requires the addition of a number of extra predicates.
6.2 Disjunctive Ordered Logic
Disjunctive Ordered Logic (DOL) is an extension of Disjunctive Logic Programming with
strong negation and inheritance (without default negation) proposed in (Buccafurri et al.
1998, Buccafurri et al. 1999). The DLP< language incorporates some ideas taken from
DOL. However, the two languages are very different in several respects. Most importantly,
unlike with DLP<, even if a program belongs to the common fragment ofDOL and of the
language of (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) (i.e., it contains neither inheritance nor default
negation),DOL semantics is completely different from Answer Set Semantics, because of
a different way of handling contradictions.8 In short, we observe the following differences
between DOL and DLP<:
• DOL does not include default negation not, while DLP< does.
• DOL andDLP< have different semantics on the common fragment. Consider a pro-
gram P consisting of a single object o = 〈oid(o),Σ(o)〉, where Σ(o) = {p. ¬p.}.
Then, according to DOL, the semantics of P is given by two models, namely, {p}
and {¬p}. On the contrary,P has no answer set according to DLP< semantics.
• DLP< generalizes (consistent) Answer Set Semantics to disjunctive logic programs
with inheritance, while DOL does not.
6.3 Prioritized Logic Programs
DLP< can be also seen as an attempt to handle priorities in disjunctive logic programs (the
lower the object in the inheritance hierarchy, the higher the priority of its rules).
There are several works on preference handling in logic programming (Delgrande, Schaub
8 Actually, this was a main motivation for the authors to look for a different language.
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and Tompits 2000, Brewka and Eiter 1998, Gelfond and Son 1997, Nute 1994, Kowalski
and Sadri 1990, Pradhan and Minker 1996, Sakama and Inoue 1996). However, we are
aware of only one previous work on priorities in disjunctive programs, namely, the paper
by Sakama and Inoue (Sakama and Inoue 1996). This interesting work can be seen as an
extension of Answer Set Semantics to deal with priorities. Comparing the two approaches
under the perspective of priority handling, we observe the following:
• On priority-free programs, the two languages yield essentially the same semantics,
as they generalize Answer Set Semantics and Consistent Answer Set Semantics,
respectively.
• In (Sakama and Inoue 1996), priorities are defined among literals, while priorities
concern program rules in DLP<.
• The different kind of priorities (on rules vs. literals) and the way how they are dealt
with in the two approaches imply different complexity in the respective reasoning
tasks. Indeed, from the simulation of abductive reasoning in the language of (Sakama
and Inoue 1996), and the complexity results on abduction reported in (Eiter, Gottlob
and Leone 1997a), it follows that brave reasoning isΣP3 -complete for the language of
(Sakama and Inoue 1996). On the contrary, brave reasoning is “only” ΣP2 -complete
in DLP<9.
(Delgrande et al. 2000) deals with nondisjunctive programs, but the authors note that
their semantics-defining transformation “is also applicable to disjunctive logic programs”.
In this formalism, the preference relation is defined by regular atoms (with a set of con-
stants representing the rules), allowing the definition of dynamic preferences. However,
the semantics of the preferences is based on the order of rule application (or defeating) and
thus seems to be quite different from our approach.
A comparative analysis of the various approaches to the treatment of preferences in (∨-
free) logic programming has been carried out in (Brewka and Eiter 1998).
6.4 Inheritance Networks
From a different perspective, the objects of a DLP< program can also be seen as the nodes
of an inheritance network.
We next show that DLP< satisfies the basic semantic principles which are required for
inheritance networks in (Touretzky 1986).
(Touretzky 1986) constitutes a fundamental attempt to present a formal mathematical
theory of multiple inheritance with exceptions. The starting point of this work is the con-
sideration that an intuitively acceptable semantics for inheritance must satisfy two basic
requirements:
1. Being able to reason with redundant statements, and
2. not making unjustified choices in ambiguous situations.
Touretzky illustrates this intuition by means of two basic examples.
The former requirement is presented by means of the Royal Elephant example, in which
9 We refer to the complexity in the propositional case here.
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we have the following knowledge: “Elephants are gray.”, “Royal elephants are elephants.”,
“Royal elephants are not gray.”, “Clyde is a royal elephant.”, “Clyde is an elephant.”
The last statement is clearly redundant; however, since it is consistent with the others
there is no reason to rule it out. Touretzky shows that an intuitive semantics should be able
to recognize that Clyde is not gray, while many systems fail in this task.
Touretzky’s second principle is shown by the Nixon diamond example, in which the
following is known: “Republicans are not pacifists.”, “Quakers are pacifists.”, “Nixon is
both a Republican and a quaker.”
According to our approach, he claims that a good semantics should draw no conclusion
about the question whether Nixon is a pacifist.
The proposed solution for the problems above is based on a topological relation, called
inferential distance ordering, stating that an individual A is ”nearer” to B than to C iff A
has an inference path through B to C. If A is ”nearer” to B than to C, then as far as A is
concerned, information coming from B must be preferred w.r.t. information coming from
C. Therefore, since Clyde is ”nearer” to being a royal elephant than to being an elephant,
he states that Clyde is not gray. On the contrary no conclusion is taken on Nixon, as there
is not any relationship between quaker and republican.
The semantics of DLP< fully agrees with the intuition underlying the inferential dis-
tance ordering.
Example 11
Let us represent the Royal Elephant example in our framework:
elephant {gray.}
royal elephant : elephant {¬gray.}
clyde : elephant, royal elephant { }
The only answer set of the above DLP< program is {¬gray}.
The Nixon Diamond example can be expressed in our language as follows:
republican {¬pacifist.}
quaker {pacifist.}
nixon : republican, quaker { }
This DLP< program has no answer set, and therefore no conclusion is drawn.
6.5 Updates in Logic Programs
The definition of the semantics of updates in logic programs is another topic where DLP<
could potentially be applied. Roughly, a simple formulation of the problem is the follow-
ing: Given a (∨-free) logic program P and a sequence U1, · · · , Un of successive updates
(insertion/deletion of ground atoms), determine what is or is not true in the end. Expressing
the insertion (deletion) of an atom A by the rule A← (¬A←), we can represent this prob-
lem by a DLP< knowledge base {〈t0, P 〉, 〈t1, {U1}〉, · · · , 〈tn, {Un}〉} (ti intuitively rep-
resents the instant of time when the update Ui has been executed), where tn < · · · < t0.10
The answer sets of the program for tk can be taken as the semantics of the execution of
10 In this context, < should be interpreted as “more recent”.
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U1, · · · , Uk on P . For instance, given the logic program P = {a← b, not c} and the up-
dates U1 = {b.}, U2 = {c.}, U3 = {¬b.}, we build the DLP< program
t0 { a← b, c, not d. }
t1 : t0 { b. }
t2 : t1 { c. }
t3 : t2 { ¬b. }.
The answer set {a, b, c} of the program for t2 gives the semantics of the execution of
U1 and U2 on P; while the answer set {c} of the program for t3 expresses the semantics of
the execution of U1, U2 and U3 on P in the given order.
The semantics of updates obtained in this way is very similar to the approach adopted
for the ULL language in (Leone et al. 1995). Further investigations are needed on this topic
to see whether DLP< can represent update problems in more general settings like those
treated in (Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1994) and in (Alferes et al. 1998a). A comparative
analysis of various approaches to updating logic programs is being carried out in (Eiter,
Fink, Sabbatini and Tompits 2000). Preliminaries results of this work show that, under
suitable syntactic conditions,DLP< supports a nice “iterative” property for updates, which
is missed in other formalisms.
7 Implementation Issues
7.1 From DLP< to Plain DLP
In this section we show how a DLP< program can be translated into an equivalent plain
disjunctive logic program (with strong negation, but without inheritance). The translation
allows us to exploit existing disjunctive logic programming (DLP) systems for the imple-
mentation of DLP<.
Notation.
1. Let P be the input DLP< program.
2. We denote a literal by φ(X¯), where X¯ is the tuple of the literal’s arguments, and
φ represents an adorned predicate, that is either a predicate symbol p or a strongly
negated predicated symbol ¬p. Two adorned predicates are complementary if one
is the negation of the other (e.g., q and ¬q are complementary). ¬.φ denotes the
complementary adorned predicate of the adorned predicate φ.
3. An adorned predicate φ is conflicting if both φ(X¯) and ¬.φ(Y¯ ) occur in the heads
of rules in P .
4. Given an object o in P , and a head literal φ(X¯) of a defeasible rule in Σ(o), we
say that φ is threatened in o if a literal ¬.φ(Y¯ ) occurs in the head of a rule in Σ(o′)
where o′ < o. A defeasible rule r in Σ(o) is threatened in o if all its head literals are
threatened in o.
The rewriting algorithm translating DLP< programs in plain disjunctive logic programs
with constraints11 is shown in Figure 2.
An informal description of how the algorithm proceeds is the following:
11 Again we use constraints for clarity, see footnote 5 on page 13
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ALGORITHM
INPUT: a DLP<-program P
OUTPUT: a plain disjunctive logic program with constraints DLP (P)
1: DLP (P)⇐ {prec′(o, o1)← | o < o1}
2: for each object o ∈ O(P) do
3: for each threatened adorned predicate φ in o do
4: Add the following rule to DLP (P):
5: ovr′(φ, o,X1, · · · , Xn)← ¬.φ′(X,X1, · · · , Xn), prec′(X, o)
6: where n is the arity of φ and X,X1, · · · , Xn are distinct variables.
7: end for
8: for each rule r in Σ(o), say φ1(X¯1) ∨ · · · ∨ φn(X¯n)← BODY , do
9: if r is threatened then
10: Add the following two rules to DLP (P):
11: φ′1(o, X¯1) ∨ · · · ∨ φ
′
n(o, X¯n)← BODY, not ovr
′(r, o, X¯1, ..., X¯n)
12: ovr′(r, o, X¯1, ..., X¯n)← ovr′(φ1, o, X¯1), ..., ovr′(φn, o, X¯n)
13: else
14: Add the following rule to DLP (P):
15: φ′1(o, X¯1) ∨ · · · ∨ φ′n(o, X¯n)← BODY
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: for each adorned predicate φ appearing in P do
20: Add the following rule to DLP (P):
21: φ(X1, · · · , Xn)← φ′(X0, X1, · · · , Xn)
22: where n is the arity of φ and X0, · · · , Xn are distinct variables.
23: end for
24: for each conflicting adorned predicate φ appearing in P do
25: Add the following constraint to DLP (P):
26: ← φ(X1, · · · , Xn),¬.φ(X1, · · · , Xn)
27: where n is the arity of φ and X1, · · · , Xn are distinct variables.
28: end for
Figure 2. A Rewriting Algorithm
• DLP (P) is initialized to a set of facts with head predicate prec′ representing the
partial ordering among objects (statement 1).
• Then, for each object o in O(P):
— For each threatened literal φ(X¯) appearing in o, rules defining when the literal
is overridden are added (statements 3–7).
— For each rule r belonging to o:
1. If r is threatened, then the rule is rewritten, such that the head literals include
information about the object in which they have been derived, and the body
includes a literal which satisfies the rule if it is overridden. In addition, a rule
is added which encodes when the rule is overridden (statements 9–12).
2. Otherwise (i.e., if r is not threatened) just the rule head is rewritten as de-
scribed above, since these rules cannot be overridden (statements 13–15).
• For all adorned predicates in the program, we add a rule which states that an atom
with this predicate holds, no matter in which object it has been derived (statements
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19–23). The information in which object an atom has been derived is only needed
for determination of overriding.
• Finally, statements 24–28 add a constraint for each adorned predicate, which pre-
vents the generation of inconsistent sets of literals.
DLP (P) is referred to as the DLP version of the program P .12
We now give an example to show how the translation works:
Example 12
The datalog version DLP (P) of the program P of Example 1 is:
(1) rules expliciting partial order among objects :
prec′(o2, o1).
(2) rules for threatened adorned predicates in o1 :
ovr′(a, o1)← ¬a′(X), prec′(X, o1).
ovr′(¬b, o1)← b
′(X), prec′(X, o1).
(3) rewriting of rules in o1 :
a′(o1) ∨ ¬b′(o1)← c, not d, not ovr′(r1, o1).
ovr′(r1, o1)← ovr′(a, o1), ovr′(¬b, o1).
e′(o1)← b.
(4) rewriting of rules in o2 :
¬a′(o2) ∨ c′(o2).
b′(o2).
c′(o2)← b.
(5) projection rules :
a← a′(X). ¬a← ¬a′(X).
b← b′(X). ¬b← ¬b′(X).
c← c′(X). d← d′(X).
e← e′(X).
(6) constraints :
← a,¬a.
← b,¬b.
Given a model M for DLP (P), pi(M) is the set of literals obtained from M by elimi-
nating all the literals with a “primed” predicate symbol, i.e. a predicate symbol in the set
{prec′, ovr′} ∪ {φ′ | ∃ an adorned literal φ(X¯) appearing in P}. pi(M) is the set of
literals without all atoms which were introduced by the translation algorithm.
The DLP version of a DLP<-program P can be used in place of P in order to evaluate
answer sets of P . The result supporting the above statement is the following:
Theorem 4
Let P be a DLP<-program. Then, for each answer set M for P there exists a consistent
answer set M ′ for DLP (P) such that pi(M ′) =M . Moreover, for each consistent answer
set M ′ for DLP (P) there exists an answer set M for P such that pi(M ′) =M .
12 DLP (P) is a function-free disjunctive logic program. Allowing functions could make the algorithm notation
more compact, but would not give any computational benefit.
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Proof
First we show that given an answer set M for P there exists a consistent answer set M ′
for DLP (P) such that pi(M ′) = M . We proceed by constructing the model M ′. Let
K1 = {prec′(o, o1) | o < o1}. Let K2 be the set of ground literals ovr′(r, o, X¯) such
that there exists a (defeasible) rule r ∈ ground(P) with obj of(r) = o such that r is
overridden in M and X¯ is the tuple of arguments appearing in the head of r. Let K3 be
the set of ground literals ovr′(L, o) such that there exist two rules r, r′ ∈ ground(P) such
that L ∈ Head(r), r is defeasible and r′ overrides r in L. Let denote by K the collection
of sets of ground literals such that each element K ∈ K satisfies the following properties:
1. for each literal φ(X¯) ∈M there is a literal φ′(o, X¯) in K , for some object identifier
o,
2. for each r ∈ GM (P) such that the body of r is true in M , for at least one literal
φ(X¯) of the head of r a corresponding literal φ′(obj of(r), X¯) occurs in K ,
3. K ⊆ {φ′(o, X¯) | φ(X¯) is an adorned predicate appearing in P ∧ o ∈ O},
4. K is a consistent set of literals.
First observe that the family K is not empty (i.e., there is at least a set of consistent sets of
literals satisfying items (1), (2) and (3) above). This immediately follows from the fact that
M is an answer set of the program P .
Let MK = K1 ∪ K2 ∪ K3 ∪ K ∪ M , for a generic K ∈ K. It is easy to show that
GMK (DLP (P)) is independent on which K ∈ K is chosen. Indeed, no literals from K
appear in the NAF part of the rules in ground(DLP (P)).
Now we examine which rules the program pos(GMK (DLP (P))) contains (for any set
K ∈ K).
Both the rules with head predicate prec′ and ovr′ and the rules of the form φ(X¯) ←
φ′(X, X¯) (added by statement 21 of Figure 2) appear unchanged in pos(GMK (DLP (P))).
Indeed, these rules do not contain a NAF part (recall that the GL transformation can modify
only rules in which a NAF part occurs). Each constraint of DLP (P) (added by statement
26 of the algorithm), that is a rule of the form b ← φ(X¯),¬.φ(X¯), not b (where b is a
literal not occurring in MK) is translated into the rule b← φ(X¯),¬.φ(X¯).
The other rules in pos(GMK (DLP (P))) originate from rules of ground(DLP (P))
obtained by rewriting rules of ground(P) (see statements 11 and 15 of the algorithm).
Thus, consider a rule r of ground(P).
If r is defeasible and overridden in M then the corresponding rule in ground(DLP (P))
(generated by statement 11 of the algorithm) contains a NAF part not satisfied in MK , by
construction of K2 and K3. Hence, such a rule appears neither in pos(GM (P)) nor in
pos(GMK (DLP (P))).
The other case we have to consider is that the rule r is either a strict rule or a defeasible
rule not overridden in M .
First suppose that r is a strict rule or is a defeasible rule not threatened in M (recall that a
rule not threatened in M is certainly not overridden in M ). In this case, the corresponding
rule, say r′ in ground(DLP (P)) (generated by statement 15 of the algorithm) has the
same body of r and the head modified by renaming predicates (from φ to φ′) and by adding
the object o (from which the rule r comes) as first argument in each head literal. Since
the body of r′ does not contain literals from K1,K2,K3 and K , and further M ⊆ MK
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(for each K ∈ K), r′ is eliminated by the GL transformation w.r.t. MK if and only if r is
eliminated by the GL transformation w.r.t. M . Moreover, in case r′ is not eliminated by the
GL transformation w.r.tMK , since the body of r′ does not contain literals fromK1,K2,K3
and K , the GL transformation w.r.t. MK modifies the body of r′ in the same way the GL
transformation w.r.t. M modifies the body of r. Thus, each rule r in pos(GM (P)) has a
corresponding rule in pos(GMK (DLP (P))) with the same body and a rewritten head.
Now suppose that r is a threatened defeasible rule that is not overridden in M . In this
case, the corresponding rule, say r′ in ground(DLP (P)) (generated by statement 11 of
the algorithm) has the head modified by renaming predicates (from φ to φ′) and by adding
the object o as first argument in each head literal and a body obtained by adding to the body
of r a literal of the form not ovr′(r, o, X¯), where o is the object from which r comes, and
X¯ represents the tuple of terms appearing in the head literals of r. Since the rule r is not
overridden in M , the literal ovr′(r, o, X¯) cannot belong to K2 and hence cannot belong
to MK . Thus, the GL transformation w.r.t MK eliminates the NAF part of the rule r′. As
a consequence, also in this case, each rule in pos(GM (P)) has a corresponding rule in
pos(GMK (DLP (P))) with
Now we prove that, for any K ∈ K, MK is a model for pos(GMK (DLP (P))). In-
deed, rules with head predicate prec′ are clearly satisfied. Further, rules with head predi-
cate ovr′ are satisfied by construction of set K2, K3 and K . Moreover, rules of the form
φ(X¯) ← φ′(X, X¯) are satisfied since M ⊆ MK and by construction of K . Rules of
pos(GMK (DLP (P))) of the form b ← φ(X¯), not φ(X¯), originated by the translation of
the constraints, are satisfied since MK is a consistent set of literals.
Consider now the remaining rules (those corresponding to rules of pos(GM (P))). Let r
be a rule of pos(GMK (DLP (P))) and r′ the rule of pos(GM (P)) corresponding to r. As
shown earlier, the two rules have the same body. Thus, if the body of r is true w.r.t. MK ,
the body of r′ is true w.r.t. M , since no literal of MK \M can appear in the body of the
rule r′ (and hence of the rule r). As a consequence, by property (2) of the collection K to
which the set K belongs, the head of the rule r is true in MK .
Thus, MK is a model for pos(GMK (DLP (P))).
Now we prove the following claim:
Claim 1. Let M¯ be a model for pos(GMK (DLP (P))). Then, pi(M¯) is a model for
pos(GM (P)).
Proof
By contradiction suppose that pi(M¯) is not a model for pos(GM (P)). Thus, there exists a
rule r ∈ pos(GM (P)) with body true in pi(M¯ ) and head false in pi(M¯). Since, as shown
earlier, the rule r has a corresponding rule r′ in pos(GMK (DLP (P))) with the same
body of r and the head obtained by replacing each literal φ(X¯) of the head of r by the
corresponding literal φ′(o, X¯), where o is the object from which r comes. Since pi(M¯) is
a model for pos(GMK (DLP (P))), at least one of the ”φ′ literal” of the head of r′ must
be true in pi(M¯). Then, due to the presence of the rules of the form φ(X¯)← φ′(X, X¯) in
pos(GMK (DLP (P))), pi(M¯) must contain also the ”φ corresponding literal” belonging
to the head of r (contradiction)
Moreover we prove that each model for pos(GMK (DLP (P)))
(1) contains M , and
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(2) belongs to K.
To prove item (1), suppose by contradiction M¯ is a model for pos(GMK (DLP (P))) such
that M ∩ M¯ 6= M . Thus, pi(M¯ ) ⊂ M . On the other hand, by Claim 1, pi(M¯) is a model
for pos(GM (P)). But since M is an answer set for P and then a minimal model for
pos(GM (P)), a contradiction arises.
Now we have to prove the item (2) above. First observe that the properties 3. and 4.
of the family K are trivially verified by the models of pos(GMK (DLP (P))). Thus, by
contradiction suppose there exists a model M¯ of pos(GMK (DLP (P))) such that it does
not satisfy one of the properties 1. or 2. characterizing the family K.
First suppose that property 1. is not satisfied by M¯ , that is, there is a literal φ(X¯) in M
such that no corresponding literal φ′(o, X¯) occurs in M¯ , for some object identifier o. Let
M¯ ′ be the set obtained by M¯ by eliminating all such literals φ(X¯). It is easy to see that M¯ ′
is still a model for pos(GMK (DLP (P))). Indeed, rules of the form φ(X¯) ← φ′(X, X¯)
are satisfied since literals φ(X¯) dropped from M¯ do not have corresponding ”φ′ literals”
by hypothesis. Further, no other rule in pos(GMK (DLP (P))) contains a literal from M
in the head. On the other hand, by Claim 1, pi(M ′) is a model for pos(GM (P)). But this
is a contradiction, since pi(M ′) ⊂M and M is an answer set for P .
Suppose now that property 2. is not satisfied by M¯ , that is, there is a rule r ∈ pos(GM (P))
such that the body of r is true in M and no ”φ′ literals” corresponding to literals of
the head occur in M¯ . Since, M ⊆ M¯ (see item (1) above), the corresponding rule of
pos(GMK (DLP (P))) is not satisfied. But this implies that M¯ can not be a model for
pos(GMK (DLP (P))) (contradiction).
A consequence of the fact that every model of pos(GMK (DLP (P))) containsM is that
every model of pos(GMK (DLP (P))) must contain the sets K1, K2 and K3. because of
the rules added by statements 1,5 and 12 of the algorithm.
Thus, the model M ′ = MK′ for K ′ ∈ K such that no set K¯ ∈ K exists such that
K¯ ⊂ K ′ is a minimal model for pos(GMK (DLP (P)), that is, a consistent answer set for
DLP (P). Hence, the first part of the proof is concluded, since pi(M ′) =M .
Now, we prove that given a consistent answer set M ′ for DLP (P), M = pi(M ′) is an
answer set for P .
First we prove that a literal φ(X¯) belongs to M if and only if there exits a literal φ′(o, X¯)
in M ′, for some object identifier o.
Indeed, φ(X¯) ∈ M implies that φ(X¯) ∈ M ′. But since M ′ is a minimal model for
pos(GM ′(DLP (P)), there must exits a rule in pos(GM ′ (DLP (P)) with head contain-
ing the literal φ(X¯) and body true w.r.t. M ′ (otherwise the literal φ(X¯) could be dropped
from M ′ without invalidate any rule of pos(GM ′(DLP (P)) and thus M ′ would not be
minimal). Conversely, if φ′(o, X¯) ∈ M ′, for some object identifier o, the literal φ(X¯) be-
longs to M ′, since M ′ is a model for pos(GM ′ (DLP (P)) and the rule φ(X¯)← φ′(o, X¯)
belongs to pos(GM ′ (DLP (P)). Thus, φ(X¯) ∈M .
Moreover, we prove that every rule of pos(GM ′ (DLP (P)) has a corresponding rule in
pos(GM (P)) with same body and a head obtained by replacing the φ′ literals with the
φ corresponding ones and by eliminating the object argument from these literals. Indeed,
from the above result, the GL transformation deletes a rule r from ground(DLP (P)) if
either the corresponding rule belonging to ground(P) is overridden in M (due the the
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Figure 3. Flow diagram of the system.
literal not ovr′(r, o, X¯) occurring in the body of r) or some negated (by negation not)
literal is false in M ′. But this literal is false in M ′ if and only if it is false in M . On the
other hand, in case the rule is not deleted by the GL transformation, its body is rewritten in
the same way of the corresponding rule appearing in pos(GM (P)).
As a consequence, M is a model for pos(GM (P)). Indeed, if the body of a rule r of
pos(GM (P)) is true w.r.t. M , the corresponding rule r′ of pos(GM ′ (DLP (P)) has the
body true w.r.t. M ′. Hence, at least one of the head literals of r′ must be true in M ′. Let
φ′(o, X¯) such a literal. As shown earlier, this implies that φ(X¯) belongs to M . But φ(X¯)
appears in the head of r and hence r is satisfied in M .
Now we prove that M is minimal. By contradiction, suppose that M¯ ⊂ M is a model
for pos(GM (P)). Consider the literals belonging to the set M \ M¯ . Because of the cor-
respondence between the rules of pos(GM (P)) and the rules of pos(GM ′ (DLP (P)), the
set of literals obtained from M ′ by eliminating all the literals φ(X¯) belonging to the set
M \ M¯ as well as the corresponding φ′ literals is still a model for pos(GM ′ (DLP (P)).
But this is a contradiction, since M ′ is a consistent answer set for DLP (P).
Since M is a model for pos(GM (P)) and is minimal, M = pi(M ′) is an answer set for
the program P . Hence the proof is concluded.
Example 13
Consider the program P of Example 1. It is easy to see that DLP (P) (see Example
12) admits one consistent answer set M = {prec′(o2, o1), a′(o1), e′(o1), b′(o2), c′(o2),
ovr′(¬b, o1), a, e, b, c}. Thus, pi(M) = {a, b, c, e}. On the other hand, pi(M) is the only
answer set for P , as shown in Example 6.
7.2 System Architecture
We have used the DLV system (Eiter et al. 1998) to implement a system for DLP<. The
concept is that of a front-end to plain DLP, which has been used before for implementing
various ways of reasoning modes and languages on top of the DLV system. The front-
end implements the translation described in Section 7. A schematic visualization of its
architecture is shown in Figure 3.
First of all, we have extended the DLV parser to incorporate the DLP< syntax. In this
way, all the advanced features of DLV (e.g. bounded integer arithmetics, comparison built-
ins, etc.) are also available with DLP<. The Rewriter module implements the translation
depicted in Figure 2. Once the rewritten version pi(P) of P is generated, its answer sets
are then computed using the DLV core. Before the output is shown to the user, pi is applied
to each answer set in order to strip the internal predicates from the output.
On the webpage (Faber 1999) the system is described in detail. It has been fully incor-
porated into the DLV system. To use it, just supply an input file using the syntax described
in Section 2 — DLV automatically invokes the DLP< frontend in this case.
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Note that it is currently required to specify the objects in the order of the inheritance
hierarchy: Specifying that some object inherits from another object which has not been
defined before will result in an error. Since cyclic dependencies are not allowed in our
language, this requirement is not a restriction.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a new language, namedDLP<, resulting from the extension of (function-
free) disjunctive logic programming with inheritance. DLP< comes with a declarative
model-theoretic semantics, where possible conflicts are solved in favor of more specific
rules (according to the inheritance hierarchy). DLP< is a consistent generalization of the
Answer Set Semantics of disjunctive logic programs, it respects some fundamental inher-
itance principles, and it seems to be suitable also to give a semantics to updates in logic
programs.
While inheritance enhances the knowledge representation modeling features of disjunc-
tive logic programming, the addition of inheritance does not increase its computational
complexity. Thus, inheritance “comes for free”: the user can take profit of its knowledge
modeling ability, without paying any extra cost in terms of computational load. It was
therefore possible to implement a DLP< system on top of the disjunctive logic program-
ming system DLV. The system is freely available on the web (Faber 1999) and ready-to-use
for experimenting with the use of inheritance in KR applications.
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